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In adopting new theoretical advancements within linguistics and ecological psychology, 
this paper investigates humor from an ecological perspective in naturally occurring social 
interaction. In doing so, it is claimed that the notions of language as coordination and 
values-realizing can provide a new understanding of humor as it appears in human 
interaction. This argument will be unfolded as a rethinking of Wallace Chafe’s notion 
of nonseriousness (Chafe, 2007) that re-conceptualizes Chafe’s idea of a ‘mental state’ 
of nonseriousness in terms of interactional affordances and values realizing. This 
perspective is laid out in in-depth analyses of video recordings of two real-life examples 
from different settings: two siblings playing and a sequence from a couple-therapy 
session. It is claimed that both examples of interactional humor can be explained by 
re-conceptualizing humor as a distinct way of being together. Thus, the emergence 
of humor is enabled by a shift in the coordinative dynamics rather than by a transfer 
of semantic ‘content’ from a speaker to a hearer. Finally, humor is investigated as 
a temporal phenomenon integrating immediate ’here-and-now’ environmental features 
with socio-cultural expectations on a longer time-scale. In this way humor is viewed 
as a particular type of values-realizing activity that constrains our actions, re-directs 
our attention, and thereby enables us to act in a more playful and joyous manner.
Key words: social interaction, humor, affordances, interpersonal coordination, values 
realizing
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HUMOR AS INTERACTIONAL AFFORDANCES: AN ECOLOGICAL 
PERSPECTIVE ON HUMOR IN SOCIAL INTERACTION
Introduction: Interactional humor 
This article investigates humor from an ecological perspective as “a mode 
of interaction” (Norrick & Chiaro, 2009). That is, humor viewed as 
a relational phenomenon emerging from a re-organization of the shared 
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attention among participants in social interaction. The object of study is 
the way that humor and laughter emerge as spontaneously occurring 
phenomena in the fast flow of naturally occurring human interaction. This 
implies another take on humor and laughter than the one traditionally dominating 
research in humor studies. Thus, the focus here is not on ‘planned humor’ such 
as well-prepared jokes, pun, or punchlines (Flieger, 1991; Koestler, 1964; 
Perlmutter, 2000; Pinker, 1994; Raskin, 1985), nor is it on well-defined 
linguistic figures such as irony, sarcasm or counterfactuals (Bryant & Gibbs, 
2015; Gibbs & Colston, 2007). Instead, the aim of the article is to explore and 
understand humor as something more basic than jokes, more interactive than 
semantic incongruity (Attardo & Raskin, 1991), and more embodied than social 
positioning (Hay, 2000; Samermit & Gibbs, 2016). A bigger, more complex 
canvas is needed. 
I will call the phenomenon under scrutiny interactional humor. This term 
is used to differentiate humor as a distinct form of behavior different from 
the more common idea of humor as ‘an inner feeling’ or a personality trait. 
Furthermore, it highlights humor as a spontaneous phenomenon in social 
interaction different from both planned humor in staged discourse such as 
stand-up comedy, television shows and so on, and also from carefully 
developed humor in cultural products of any kind (satire, literature, film, 
music, commercials etc.). The term is partly related to the notion of 
conversational joking (Ervin-Tripp & Lampert, 2009; Norrick, 1993,) but 
differs from it in terms of not being about jokes per se, nor having a primary 
focus on the social functions of humor.  
Interactional humor cannot be reduced to the use of words, timing, 
expressive behaviors, laughter and inter-bodily dynamics; still, it cannot be 
properly understood without a consideration of the entanglement of these 
aspects either. Interactional humor is never a uniquely individual endeavor in 
the sense that it relies heavily on co-construction, collaboration, cooperation, 
and coordination among different participants to ‘get off the ground’. In this 
light, interactional humor is something we do together if we do it at all. It is 
part of our languaging behavior (Thibault, 2011), the way we ‘do language’ as 
an interpersonal activity (Fusaroli, et al., 2014; Jensen and Pedersen, 2016). 
This of course points to the fact that having fun and laughing together during 
a conversation is one of the most fundamental ways in which we attach to each 
other and thereby acquire a sense of well-being and adherence. But which 
features in the course of social interaction invite such actions? What are 
the enabling conditions for interactional humorous actions? These questions will 
be at the core of the investigation of this article. 
Theory and analyses
The investigations are conducted from an ecological perspective (Gibson, 
1979), with reference in particular to language as coordination (Cowley, Unauthenticated
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2011; Harvey, 2015; Jensen, 2014a; Kravchenko, 2009; Love, 2004; 
Raczaszek-Leonardi and Nomikou, 2015; Steffensen, 2009; Thibault, 
2011; Trasmundi, 2015), and the closely related notions of affordances 
(Chemero, 2011; Gallagher, 2017) and values-realizing (Hodges, 2009, 
2017). Traditionally, humor has been conceptualized as primarily 
an individual phenomenon originating in the mind of the ‘joke teller’ and explained 
by reference to the intentions of an individual speaker or performer (Flieger, 
1991; Koestler, 1964; Perlmutter, 2000; Pinker, 1994; Raskin, 1985). 
However, in this study, the focus is on how humor is enabled by shared 
attention and cooperation in terms of co-thinking and co-feeling among 
different participants in interaction. This includes a focus on humor as 
the product of an emerging and enacted field of potential actions embedded 
in a conversational ecology of languaging features such as posture, gesture, 
voice, facial movements, intonation, hesitations etc. along with verbal actions. 
The key point is that humor is seen as realizing a distinct type of interactional 
affordances that is informed and driven by variables and forces operating 
at different time scales. 
The analytical section is based on two empirical examples from video 
recordings of people interacting; the first example is a sequence of two 
children, a sister and younger brother, interacting in a humorous way, while 
the second example concerns adults, a married couple in couple’s therapy, 
jointly responding to an awkward situation in a humorous way. The examples 
are quite different but a unifying aspect is the spontaneous inter-bodily 
coordination that paves the way for a sudden shift in the interactive flow. 
Thus, the analyses center on how the interplay between words and bodily 
action alters the possible ways of perceiving a given situation and thereby 
makes interactional humor possible. In this perspective, interactional humor 
is seen as a distinct type of values-realizing activity (Hodges, 2009), or 
a directedness in the dialogical system (Steffensen, 2012) that allows for a shift 
in perspective and (inter)actions of a more playful, joyous and explorative 
character.
This way of looking at humor, in turn, has implications for an 
anti-representational approach to the discussion on content or ‘the meaning 
of words’ in the fields of radical embodied cognition and distributed 
language (Chemero, 2011; Cowley, 2011a; Harvey, 2015; Jensen, 2014; 
Jensen and Pedersen, 2016; Love, 2004; Steffensen, 2009). I will argue that 
interactional humor does not chiefly arise as a consequence of the content or 
representational value of the words used as such, rather interactional humor 
is tied to the attentional value of words and phrases; the way in which they 
re-organize the shared attention and thereby transform the direction and 
structure of the situation1. This argument will be unfolded as a rethinking of 
1 Of course, this is not necessarily an either-or choice. The attentional value of the words used is always tied 
to both the present context with its situation-specific interactional affordances as well as the conventional Un uthenticat d
Download Date | 8/16/18 9:24 AM
241 T. W. JENSEN
Wallace Chafe’s notion of nonseriousness (Chafe, 2007). The aim is to show 
that Chafe’s idea of a ‘mental state’ of nonseriousness, supposedly underlying 
laughter and humor, can be rethought as a particular kind of values-realizing. 
In a conversation interactants perceive a field of potential actions or 
affordances; consequently, what we traditionally call ‘humor’ can be seen as 
a way of realizing a less usual type of conversational affordance. 
Language as coordination 
In recent years, an increasing number of scholars have begun to investigate 
and understand language (spoken language in particular), not as primarily 
a code system, nor as a mean of mental representation, but rather as 
a sophisticated mean of embodied and social coordination (Cowley, 2011; 
Fusaroli, et al., 2014; Harvey, 2015; Jensen, 2014; Kravchenko, 2009; 
Linell, 2009; Love, 2004; Raczaszek-Leonardi & Nomikou, 2015; 
Steffensen, 2015; Thibault, 2011; Trasmundi, 2015). A shared assumption 
in many of these studies is a distinction between first-order language, or 
languaging, that is language as a whole bodied sense-making behavior, 
different from second-order language as a temporal and socially molded 
constraint on the first order behavior. In relation to human conversation 
this view on language entails a shift of focus away from both individually 
produced utterances and their logical underpinnings, as in speech act theory 
(Searle, 1969), as well as on micro-sociological sequential structure and 
the reproduction of social normativity, as in conversation analysis (Hutchby 
& Wooffitt, 2011). Instead the prime focus is on coordination. As such, 
recent studies show that two or more people engaged in joint tasks, both merely 
‘social’ or goal-oriented towards some kind of problem solving, often come 
to adapt their behaviors through a trajectory of compensatory complementary 
behaviors meaning that “these behaviors influence one another locally and 
incrementally, making the whole conversational performance itself a kind 
of self-organizing synergy” (Dale, et al., 2013, p. 56). Thus, a crucial 
difference in talking about coordination rather than for instance ‘communication’, 
is that the latter still – to some extent - entails an idea of two separate 
positions (sender/receiver - speaker/hearer) that exchange something 
(thoughts, ideas, feelings, directives, metaphors etc.) between them in some 
manner, while the former emphasizes the adaptive and self-organizing nature 
of human interaction to the degree that human dialogue is viewed as 
a functional whole (Dale, et al, 2013; Fusaroli et al., 2014): Human 
behavior, including speaking, forms a living system that is only divided 
into separate entities of sender-receiver as part of an analytical process of 
isolating and ascribing meaning to individuals.
meaning of the words; only the conventional meaning is never fixed in social interaction since it will always 
be part of the flexible action potential of the ongoing situation. Unauthenticated
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Furthermore, an ecological perspective centers on the entanglement and 
coordination of inter-bodily activity and verbal actions in the here-and-now 
with situation-transcendent features of cultural conditions and past 
experiences on longer time-scales. A central assumption is that social interaction 
needs to be studied within a perspective that attempts to account for both 
the great level of detail in the-here-and-now as well as social and cultural 
dimensions outside of the present situation influencing the ongoing dialogue. 
An ecological perspective on language offers such a way of looking at 
language that incorporates many levels of constraints that dynamically 
organize the in-the-moment interactive behavior and experience, including 
evolutionary forces, bodily dynamics, cultural and social conditions, 
knowledge of language (lexical, grammatical, pragmatic), institutional settings 
and so forth. In relation to interactional humor one particularly relevant 
phenomenon is the dialogical notion of third parties. Third parties concern 
an aspect of the curious fact that a conversation never happens in isolation: 
In a conversation one does not just talk with some concrete other who is 
present there and then; as a participant, one also orients to, exploits, and 
plays with ideas, traditions and communicative activity types that exist 
from before and which are carried further in and through the situated 
interaction. (Linell, 2009, p. 99)
As shown in the analyses below a central dimension in interactional 
humor is the human ability to see the current conversation from a third 
person perspective2; a look from an outside field of certain normative and 
culturally loaded structures and expectations that are nevertheless re-enacted 
in the present situation. Seen from an ecological point of view these 
‘non-local’ patterns are interactional affordances for different types of action. 
Interactional affordances as values-realizing
The notion of affordance derives from James Gibson’s theory of 
perception (Gibson, 1979) and offers an interesting perspective on how 
the environment guides and scaffolds action and perception; a perspective 
that can prove relevant also in relation to a new understanding of humor. 
Affordances are often explained as action possibilities, which, according to 
Gibson, are what the environment “offers the animal, what it provides or 
furnishes, either for good or ill” (Gibson, 1979, p. 127). The core idea is that 
the agent (animal or human) perceives the possibilities for action within 
an environment directly. Direct perception means that an agent perceives, not 
neutral pieces of information that need to be put together, but instead a world 
of value in accordance with the agent’s distinct abilities: The seagull directly 
perceives the surface of the water as an opportunity to land (or look for food), 
2 Likewise, in various studies related notions such as represented discourse, or reported speech, repetition, 
and footing have been used to analyze and understand humor in interaction (See for instance: Attardo, 1994; 
Norrick, 1993; Tannen, 2005 and 2007). Unauthenticated
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while humans may see the same surface as opportunity to swim or dip a toe. 
Within a contemporary ecological perspective, Anthony Chemero has 
convincingly argued that affordances are profoundly relational phenomena 
existing between the animal/human and the environment as possibilities for 
action: “Affordances are neither properties of the animal alone nor properties 
of the environment alone. Instead, they are relations between the abilities of 
an animal and some feature of a situation” (Chemero, 2013, p. 191). 
From an ecological perspective, the principal affordance of face-to-face 
encounters is the possibility to share action: The possibilities for co-action, 
co-thinking and co-feeling in the flux of social interaction (Jensen and 
Pedersen, 2016). The immediate inter-bodily dynamics enabled by 
the interactive environment in the here-and-now of “doing language”, or 
languaging (Thibault, 2011), with other people afford impulsive action 
and thought in a joint space. One such action opportunity can be the impulse 
to act together in a humorous way and whereby realizing a distinct set of 
values.
Here it is important to bear in mind that the ecological notion of 
values, closely related to the notion of affordances, is very different from 
the standard definition of values in contemporary philosophy or sociology. 
The standard view often apprehends values as properties that are reached over 
time in and through social processes and cultural traditions. On this view, there 
is nothing intrinsic about values, which are essentially a matter of social 
consensus, what a given community decides to treat as valuable or not 
valuable. In contrast to this (somewhat relativistic) view Hodges claims that: 
..all actions, whether driving or conversing with a colleague, are 
constrained and legitimated by multiple values. Values are the real goods 
that actions must realize sufficiently for an ecosystem to exist; thus values 
are obligatory demands that define what constitutes good driving or a good 
conversation. (Hodges, 2011, p. 138)
Within this ecological framework values are conceived as the fundamental 
conditions that allow, enable, and restrain the directedness of actions within 
our physical as well as social environment. This places values in a heterarchy 
rather than a hierarchy that ‘in itself’ determines right and wrong. Similar to 
the notion of languaging, this approach attempts to tie together the motivation 
for simple mundane actions, like reaching out for another cup of coffee, to 
large scale value judgments of making the right decision when being placed 
in a moral dilemma. The basic claim is that the act of defining and 
recognizing actions, cognitions, and emotions is to engage in a value-activity 
in itself. Following from this, Hodges proposes a perspective on conversing 
as a perceptual system in which we constantly orient, integrate, and try to 
find our way in order to invite responsible action: “Conversing, like driving, 
is an ecosystem defined by values. Among the values that define it are clarity, 
coherence, comprehensiveness, and complexity” (Hodges, 2009, p. 140). Unauthenticated
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As a sub-category of the overall value of complexity we can place 
interactional humor as a specific type of directedness in the ecological 
system of conversation. Engaging in humorous interaction is a specific type 
of value-realizing activity. Often interactional humor will entail a momentary 
disregard of the other prevalent values – clarity, coherence, comprehensiveness 
– or put another way; the ‘normal criteria of relevance’ are put aside for 
a brief while to pave the way for an attention towards other aspects of 
the situation. Our attention is suddenly altered and the possibility of acting in 
a different way emerges. The possibility for a new ‘path’ of engagement 
makes it possible to interact with each other in a completely different manner 
characterized by a larger degree of playfulness, surprise and joy. 
Nonseriousness in an ecological perspective
As a further illustration of the potential of an ecological account of 
humor I will now briefly turn to the notion of nonseriousness (Chafe, 2007). 
This notion has been developed within a cognitive linguistic framework, but 
I will argue that it could benefit from an ecological interpretation. According to 
Chafe, nonseriousness is a basic feeling underlying both laughter and humor. 
The feeling of nonseriousness, then, whether it is elicited by humor or 
nonhumor, can be viewed as a safety valve whose purpose, simply stated, 
is to keep us from taking seriously things it would be counterproductive 
to take seriously. (..) This feeling, manifested in these ways [by laughing], 
may have evolved as an adaptive response to whatever situations early 
humans encountered in which it would be counterproductive to act or 
think seriously. Such situations were kept from entering a person’s serious 
cognitive repertoire, a person’s knowledge of how the world really is. (Chafe, 
2007, p. 11) 
Thus, the notion of nonseriousness draws on experiences where 
an inconsistency arises between how we normally perceive the world and 
how a situation presents itself. Chafe gives an example in which we see 
a dog looking at a newspaper while moving its head as if it was reading. 
It would be counterproductive to take the reading dog seriously; instead 
we indulge in a pleasant feeling of nonseriousness and typically start 
laughing. However, a seemingly reading dog is rare to encounter. A less 
unusual example – pointing more to the cooperative basis of nonseriousness 
- could be me seeing a friend walking across a room or a large space and 
suddenly stumbling over something and falling to the ground. If it looks 
serious, if he seems shocked or perhaps injured, I will not laugh but instead 
aid and make sure he is all right. If not, if he looks fine, only overwhelmed 
with surprise, I will perhaps not treat it seriously and instead laugh, especially 
if my friend is laughing too. Seen from this light, the feeling of nonseriousness 
is often cooperatively built among several participants in relation to Unauthenticated
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a reorganization of our attention allowing for a shift in perspective. To describe 
(interactional) humor as primarily an inner feeling (of nonseriousness), or 
a mental state, as Chafe does, is to miss its fundamental embeddedness in 
a conversational ecology. 
Thus, we can reconsider non-seriousness, in the light of the notions 
of affordances and values-realizing, as a distinct type of attention that 
makes possible a particular kind of coordination, rather than an inner 
feeling. This reconceptualization of nonseriousness places it in the midst of 
the interactional dynamics of conversation instead of being ‘locked’ in 
the heads and minds of the various participants in interaction. 
Notwithstanding these reservations, Chafe’s notion of nonseriousness still 
has something vital to offer in terms of recognizing that we need to look 
at interactional humor as something more basic than jokes, irony or sarcasm 
in the sense that, at its core, it concerns a fundamental shift in attention. This 
dimension is often downplayed or overlooked in other more popular theories 
of humor, such as incongruity theory. 
Incongruity theory and its hidden written language bias
Today many psychological or neuroscientific studies of humor 
investigate what kind of situations are most likely to evoke humorous 
responses and how they affect the neural activity of subjects (McGraw and 
Warren, 2014; Ramachandran, 1998). Such studies seek to scientifically 
investigate humor by asking participants to perform one of a variety of 
tasks, such as rate how funny some event was, how much it made them smile 
or laugh, or they let the subjects be exposed to different types of humorous 
stimuli, in comparison to non-humorous stimuli (Amir, et al., 2013; Coulson, 
2001). The experimental findings from such studies are then interpreted 
as pointing to what evokes humor and how the brain can detect something 
as humorous.
Many of these studies are motivated by some version of incongruity 
theory (Koestler, 1964), now often referred to as General Theory of Verbal 
Humor (GTVH) (Attardo & Raskin, 1991), building on the assumption that 
resolution of incongruity in semantic frames is fundamental to any kind of 
humorous expression. The basic tenet in incongruity theory is that humor 
by default contains an unexpected, often sudden, shift in semantic frame 
that need to be resolved. Most jokes, for example, establish two different 
frames of reference that are somehow in conflict. At the punchline, these two 
frames get resolved and a humorous reaction emerges. Consider for instance 
these two examples: 
A young lady was talking to the doctor who had operated her. 
“Do you think the scar will show?” she asked. 
Unauthenticated
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“That will be entirely up to you”, he said (Attardo, 1994, p. 7). 
 Two behaviorists have sex; one says to the other afterwards: 
“That was great for you; how was it for me?” (Boyd, 2004, p. 1).
Such ‘clever jokes’ involve an intentional, and well-planned, build-up of 
expectations that are broken in order to produce a humorous effect. “We wait 
for one thing, and we get another thing that is quite different but that 
nevertheless has a certain suitability” (Ziv, 1984, p. 90). The jokes entail a 
strong element of surprise and a subsequent retrieve of sense vital to humorous 
action. However, written jokes are often carefully crafted over many 
iterations and edits, in contrast to interactional humor as a more spontaneous 
phenomenon. Thus, incongruity theory seems prone to the so called written 
language bias (WLB) (Linell, 2005). In short, WLB concerns a tradition in 
both linguistics and in the humanities in general in which the models, methods 
and frameworks for describing phenomena occurring in spoken language 
environments have been taken over by from the tradition of describing 
and explaining written language and its inherent structures. Thus, from 
an ecological perspective the main problem with GTVH is that many types 
of humor, actions and situations we for some reason find funny, are not 
planned. They cannot depend on preparation and working over. Instead they 
rely on a completely different set of interpersonal affordances characterizing 
human conversation.
Interactional studies of humor and the ecological alternative
To some degree a distinction between planned and more spontaneous 
types of humor has already been addressed by interactional studies of humor 
(Attardo, 1994; Norrick, 1993; Norrick & Chiaro, 2009). This literature 
distinguishes conversational joking from other types of more planned joking. 
Conversational joking is seen as improvised drawing heavily on context 
features. Still, the focus is primarily on jokes. However, during a conversation 
we may find a situation humorous just by looking at someone’s face, by 
noticing a distinct conversational style in a certain setting, by hearing 
a characteristic tone of voice, or when our gaze meets that of our 
interlocutor’s in a particular situation. Such situations are transient and 
spontaneous and cannot be understood as jokes per se. That is, they do 
not necessarily entail a narrative structure, a build-up of expectations to be 
broken, or a conscious play of words. 
Furthermore, the interactional approach entails a shift of focus away 
from (what defines) humor as such while instead focusing on the social 
functions of jokes and humor; how humor may be part of breaking “the ice, 
fill awkward silences, smooth the way for requests, and build group solidarity” 
Unauthenticated
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(Norrick, 1993, p. 1)3. However, rather than purely sociological, sociolinguistic 
or conversation-analytic focus this study has an ecological research interest. 
Such a vantage point entails, amongst other things, a bio-social perspective 
on language and cognition (Cuffari & Jensen, 2014; Steffensen, 2015; 
Trasmundi, 2015) that strives to study facets of human behavior, such as 
humor, in situ without committing to either a biological/essentialist or 
a cultural/sociological standpoint that respectively excludes the other. 
Instead, the assumption is that there is no contradiction between seeing 
language and other types of adaptive flexible behavior: 
..as biogenic and as social, simply because sociality is our human way 
of being nature. This assumption both precludes the bio-reductionism 
that ignores supra-individual (i.e. social or cultural) dynamics and 
the socio-reductionism that ignores the metabolic and ecological foundations 
of human existence. (Steffensen, 2015, p. 117)
The way we ‘do humor’ is at once biogenic and social. Thus, to gain 
a more comprehensive understanding of humor, we need to investigate what 
makes it possible (as a human universal) as well how it functions in a social 
context (as a social variable). From an ecological perspective humor is seen 
as a particular kind of adaptive flexible human behavior in a social realm; 
“a human way of being nature” (ibid.). In this way, interactional humor might 
be an even more basic phenomenon than assumed in interactional studies of 
humor. To further explore this perspective, let us now look at the analyses.
Analytical part 
As mentioned in the introduction the analytical examples consist of 
video-recordings of children as well as adults interacting, and in that sense 
the two examples are quite different. Still, the two examples are carefully 
chosen since they can highlight different dimensions of interactional humor 
while at the same time pointing to shared fundamental features. Involving 
children, the first example is in many ways much simpler than the second, it 
involves less spoken interaction and fewer social constraints are at stake. 
Likewise, the second example is more complex being embedded in a specific 
social setting (couple’s therapy) and relying much more on a breach of social 
expectations. Still, the idea behind analyzing data involving children as well 
as adults is to highlight shared enabling conditions cutting across the differences 
in age, maturity and situation. Both situations are constituted by a sudden 
shift in the shared attention of the interlocutors relying on a precise 
3 Likewise, there is a large amount of literature dealing with the ways that humor varies in terms of 
social sub-cultures, level of education, occupation, social status, gender and maturity. See for instance: 
Goodman, 1992; Kramarae, 1981; Lakoff, 1975. Thus, it is a well-documented phenomenon that groups of 
people (friends, family members, classmate, colleagues etc.) can develop a certain type of humor among 
them that enhance the internal cohesion or solidarity within the group and at the same time may exclude 
others who are unfamiliar to this type of humor (Meyer, 2000). In particular, this has been studied in terms 
of gender (Hay, 2000, Schnurr and Holmes, 2009) and ethnicity (Vine, et al., 2009). Unauthenticated
Download Date | 8/16/18 9:24 AM
248HUMOR AS INTERACTIONAL AFFORDANCES
inter-bodily coordination briefly affording another way of being together in 
fast flow of interaction. In this sense, there is a line from the more basic type 
of humor emerging in the first example to the more complex humor developing 
in the second example. The basic argument is that the contours and trajectory 
of this line indicate something fundamental about the way that both humor 
and words work in social interaction.   
Analysis one: “Is it funny?” 
Laura, aged 5, and Jack, aged 1 ½, are sister and brother4. Like many 
siblings at that age they enjoy spending time together, often making up small 
games and laughing together. In this short sequence, they are sitting next to 
each other on the pavement in front of their house being filmed by their father. 
At a first glance the excerpt might only look like a sister and brother “fooling 
around” but a closer analysis reveals how a distinct type of values-realizing 
enables the emergence of interactional humor in this situation.
Seven seconds into the sequence something unexpected happens. Suddenly 
Laura utters DO YOU HEAR ME (l. 3) with high volume and both her 
hands around her mouth as if shouting to someone far away (see first 
picture) while also looking into the air. Now, albeit Jack has been jumping 
4 Both names are pseudonyms. A written form of consent was signed their father beforehand. The language 
used in the video clip is Danish but has been translated into English.
EXAMPLE 1
Participants: J: Jack, L: Laura 
1 J: whoa je tje h[jump] °jump° °jump° °jump°
2 L: [whoa]
3 L: DO YOU HEAR ME↑ 
4 J: HALLO:: (0.2)




7 J: ☺yeah[.ah h] hrh h[rh h]rh
8 L: [heh heh]
9 D: [heh]
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away from his sister (while babbling and articulating the word ‘jump’ several 
times – l. 1), they are still sitting within an optimal hearing distance less 
than a meter from each other. Therefore, it would seem strange to interpret 
it as a sincere factual question. Rather the wordings of Laura mark a playful 
or joking comment, most likely commenting on the fact that Jack is moving 
away from her. Furthermore, the way that the utterance stands out, in terms 
of posture, gesture and volume, also marks an informal invitation to 
a game-like activity in the sense that it affords further action in the same 
manner. This is supported when looking at Jack’s response: Immediately he 
picks up on his sister’s verbal action by uttering HALLO (l. 4) with high 
volume and prolonged vocal sound, again as if calling someone further away 
(see second picture) indicating a continuous focus on the pretended distance 
between them. Thus, we can note that already here they are about to establish 
a distinct type of attention towards the interpersonal situation; an attention 
towards the affordances for transforming the activity at hand into a more 
playful act. 
Subsequently, in line 5 Laura explicates these action possibilities by 
asking IS IT FUNNY↑ with high volume and rising intonation in the end. 
Jack does not answer right away and seems to ponder about whether this is 
actually funny (from the perspective of 1½ year old), but after a pause of 
1.2 seconds he affirms his sister’s question with a YES↑. Still, the actual 
laughing does not begin until Laura and Jack look at each other in the pause 
following line 6 (see third picture). Until now both Laura and Jack have 
looked ahead, not at each other (as part of the game accentuating the imagined 
distance between them), but just as Jack repeats his answer in line 7 (yeah) with 
a quirky and smiley voice their eyes meet and they start laughing (see fourth 
picture). For a short moment in the interactive flow – a little less than 3 seconds 
- Jack and Laura build a temporary ‘interpersonal geography’ in which they 
share attention and explore the affective affordances of the situation. In short, 
they laugh and have fun together. 
The value of non-seriousness 
Considering Chafe’s notion of non-seriousness in an ecological 
perspective we can see that the emergence of a humorous or non-serious 
way of interacting is in fact rooted in a reconfiguration of their attention that 
allows for a particular kind of coordinated activity. That is, a value-realizing 
activity embedded in the value of complexity in the sense that it is rooted 
in a self-reflective and meta-discursive verbal action (IS IT FUNNY↑) asking 
the question: Are we having fun? This question, in turn, opens up for a new 
‘path’ of engagement or different ways of interacting with each other. In this 
sense the adjacency pair sets up “discrepant kinds of awareness” (Gibson, 1979, 
p. 282) that allow for different ways of interacting with each other in an affective 
and playful manner. The exact nature of this kind of values realizing is part Unauthenticated
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of the value of complexity in the sense that it directs and re-organizes their 
joint attention towards the quality of the ongoing activity itself. That is, 
the adjacency pair (question – answer) restructures the interactional dynamics 
in the sense that the previous patterns are now treated as instances of 
‘having fun’ – and thereby the fun arises! Laura’s verbal action is naming 
their joint experience and that naming constrains their experience of what 
is happening. Laura draws on temporal experience and her ability to detect 
invariants in interactional patterns which crystalizes the experience. In turn, 
Jack confirms this experience in answering his sister’s question and 
acknowledges that their previous activity can be seen as an exemplification or 
an instance of what is normally referred to as ‘having fun’. 
In doing so, they also confirm an affective alliance that is only possible 
by engaging in the values-realizing activity of having fun in this concrete 
situation. The term ‘situation’ is here to be understood in a broad sense 
including the physical surroundings (sitting next to each other on 
the pavement), the inter-bodily dynamics (Jack jumping on his backside, Laura 
shouting, gesturing and looking into the distance), the social circumstances 
(being filmed by their father), the interpersonal relation between Laura and 
Jack as sister and brother, and finally the differences in age and cognitive 
maturity. This is clearly an asymmetrical type of interaction in which Laura 
to some extend “teaches” her younger brother how to recognize something as 
funny – in a sense it can be seen as an informal exercise in taking a 
language stance in order to have fun. All of these circumstances are enabling 
conditions for the particular kind of values-realizing leading to the humorous 
interaction. Via the shift in attention the interactional dynamics gets 
reconstructed, viewed in another light as part of what counts as funny 
activities. Laura’s question to her little brother comments on the activity in 
which they have been engaged. Thereby the level of awareness is raised and 
their attention is turned towards a particular aspect of the situation: Can we 
look at what we are doing here as a way of having fun? Thus the ‘fun’ does 
not arise as a consequence of the representational value, or the content, of 
the words used but as a consequence of their attentional value; the way in 
which they re-organize the shared attention and thereby transform the ‘purpose’ 
and structure of the situation. The central point being that the fun arises in 
and through this particular kind of values-realizing activity. It now becomes 
possible to see the situation in which they are a part in a new alternative 
perspective; a perspective that enables a humorous type of interaction. 
Analysis two: “A pause for reflection” 
This longer sequence comes from a larger set of recordings of couple’s 
therapy sessions featuring a therapist and married couples5. As an introductory 
5 The recordings were undertaken in relation to my Ph.D. project in collaboration with the Danish Imago 
Center. A written form of consent was signed by all participants beforehand. The language used in the video clip Unauthenticated
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exercise this couple is asked to mention one thing about the other that they 
appreciate and value; a request that turns out to be harder to fulfil than one 
should expect. In this example, it is the pause in line 5, or rather the way 
that the pause is being treated, that elicits the humorous interaction 
dominated by laughter. As in the first example the humorous interaction 
and laughter is enabled by a particular kind of values-realizing activity that 
allow for a specific type of attention and coordination, yet here in a more 
elaborate and cognitively sophisticated manner.
In line 1 the therapist asks the man and wife to recall and articulate 
something positive about each other. The request is even confirmed by 
the therapist in line 3 as an answer to the man’s question if it needs to be 
something specific. Thus, they both need, on the spot, to come up with 
something positive to say about their spouse. However, the following pause 
lasts almost three seconds which in the fast flow of interaction is 
a considerable time. Then in line 6 the pause is suddenly disrupted by 
M moving his shoulders up and down in small rhythmical movements 
while making hearable outbreaths surrounding and interwoven in 
the articulation of “no(h)w”. M follows up on this in line 7-8 by uttering 
now there should not be too long a pause for reflection 
with high volume and smiley voice. These actions are immediately reflected by 
is Danish but has been translated into English.
EXAMPLE 2
Participants: T: Therapist, M: Man, W: Woman
1 T: one thing (1:2) that I w[ould like to tell you] 
2 M: [it has to be something] concrete↑
3 T: it has to be absolutely 
4 M: °okay it has to be absolutely concrete°
5 (3:0)
6 M: hhch heh hh 
7 M: [no(h) h] ☺NOW THERE SHOULD NOT BE TOO LONG A PAUSE 
8 M: FOR REFLECTION:☺
9 T: [°just try°]
10 W: [heh heh heh heh heh heh hah h heh heh heh heh heh heh heh]
11 M: [.h .h .h huh huh h h]
12 T: [there must be just something .h.hah]
13 M: [heh heh oh yeah uh an amazi(h h)ng PRESSURE ☺HERE☺] 
14 W: [heh heh heh hah hah hah heh heh heh heh hah hah hah] 
15 M: ihr .h .h well okay
16 W: h .hh mhm
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a change in W’s behavior from sitting still while looking into the distance to 
a distinct  smiling-and-gazing-behavior directed towards M. In a flash, they 
engage in an interactive expressive vocal and bodily behavior that quickly turns 
into joint laughter.
Interactional humor and self-reflective action  
How is this laughter triggered then? As in the first example, the notions 
of affordances and values-realizing are useful in explaining this occurrence 
of laughter. The key lies in the way the 3 second pause is attended to by 
the husband and wife: The pause is perceived as an instance of ‘non-action’ 
at a time when action is required. Thus, the pause acquires a meaning beyond 
that of a mere breathing space or delay. It is dealt with as an instance of 
something problematic which in turn has a humorous potential. Again, it is 
a re-orientation that affords paying attention to the features of the ongoing 
activity itself, adding another layer to the conversation, and thereby enhancing 
the level of complexity, that elicits the humorous perspective. 
It is a values-realizing activity of treating action, or rather in this case 
non-action, as instances of something beyond that of the action itself. In this 
case, such a values-realizing activity has a clear social function too. M and 
W are jointly managing the social pressure arising in and through the pause 
by commenting on it and laughing together. In treating the pause as an instance 
of something problematic by commenting on it and laughing, the situation is 
also socially evaluated. As investigated by the conversation analyst, Gail 
Jefferson, laughter in interaction in certain situations has the social effect of 
dealing with sensitive topics. Something similar is at stake here; by engaging 
in a humorous interaction and laughing behavior the couple mutually 
deals with the troublesome fact that they were not, on the spot, capable of 
recalling something valuable about each other. At the same time the humorous 
perspective is made possible by a joint positioning that also treats “the problem” 
as something funny. Thus, the values-realizing activity is reconfiguring 
the joint attention of M and W in the interactional situation in the sense that 
they become able of seeing their own activities in another light. By treating 
the pause as an instance of non-action they raise their own awareness of 
how to interpret the situation. It is self-reflective action since it incorporates 
their real-time activity with a “gaze” from an outside position, and in that 
sense, it is nested in a larger second order values-realizing activity of 
contemplating about the nature of the interaction itself. 
Third parties and interactional humor  
A closer look at the trajectory of the laughter in this sequence reveals 
two significant ‘peaks’ of laughing in terms of volume, intensity, duration and 
postural sway: in line 10-11 (overlapping) as well as line 13-14 (also partial 
overlapping). Both of these peaks have a sequential placement right after Unauthenticated
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verbal and gestural actions; they seem to function as multimodal responses 
to what have just been said (and done by means of gesture) suggesting that 
these actions are not only built into the very structure of laughing, but also 
contribute significantly to its development. Thus, in line 7-8 W makes a very 
distinct gesture-and-posture (see second picture) exactly at the point when 
M says PAUSE FOR REFELCTI::ON: :) thereby providing a visual feedback 
and image reflecting the wordings. Likewise, in line 13 a similar (albeit 
not identical) gesture-and-posture is performed by M (see fourth picture) 
simultaneously with his own speech on an amazi(h)ng PRESSURE :). We can 
call these repeated gesture-and-postures an emblematic ‘thinking-gesture-
and-posture’. They have the characteristics of placing the right hand or 
fingers either on one’s cheek (first instance) or in front of the mouth (second 
instance) while wrinkling brows and looking downwards (somewhat like 
the famous “The thinker” sculpture by Auguste Rodin). These gestural 
actions have a complementary function to the ongoing speech in the laughing 
sequence since they both complement the meaning of the verbal actions of 
having to think hard whilst under pressure. As such, they provide an image 
of ‘concentration’ that in turn add to the initial stance in the sense that 
the gestural actions also ‘comment’ on the situation by evoking an image of 
a more general character. It is an image of ‘someone’ who needs to think hard. 
This is a good example of how an outside third party perspective 
is introduced into the conversation in the sense that the gestural 
“thinking-actions” accompanied by the verbal actions (now there should 
not be too long a pause for reflection – an amazing 
pressure here) depict the present situation seen from an outside 
perspective. The verbal actions comment on the present situation by 
displaying an awareness of the delicacy of the situation while the gestural 
actions “paint” a caricatured image of the issue at stake (this can also be seen 
as a hyperbole, or use of exaggeration as a rhetorical device, see Gibbs, 2007). 
The fact that they did not immediately remember something positive about 
each other may challenge and confront the standard ideas, and ideals, of how 
a marriage should be. This perspective, the normative generalized perspective 
of marital relationships, is reflected in these gestures and the verbal actions 
following them. These actions highlight the distance between how a marital 
relation ought to be (according to a certain normative perspective), and how it 
in fact presents itself in this situation. The gestural “thinking-actions” enlarge 
their difficulties (of not being able to remember something positive about 
each other) and thereby reveals the distance between ought and is, and in 
the conscious awareness of this distance lays a deeply humorous potential. 
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Conclusion: A distinct way of being together  
As mentioned in the introduction to the analyses these two examples 
may seem very different in terms of the form and type of interactional humor 
that is being enacted. Clearly the first example is in various ways much 
simpler (and shorter) than the second example. It is simpler in the sense that 
the emergence of humor is primarily tied to a reorganization of the shared 
attention. This reorganization provides a simple category, or a naming 
(having fun), for their experience which in turn produces a humorous and 
joyful effect. Of course, this has to do with the fact that the example involves 
children, and in particular the little brother is basically learning to connect 
a certain experience with a particular characterization – and in that sense 
the interactional humor in this example is closely connected to activities such 
as play and (informal) learning. The second example is much more complex 
in the sense that shift in attention towards the pause is embedded in a longer 
socio-cultural time-scale depicting contextual expectations (of how a marital 
relationship ought to be) and the ability to see how these expectations are 
broken by the present situation. Furthermore, the build-up of the interactional 
humor in this example has a longer trajectory, elaborated by means of both 
words and gestures. 
Nonetheless, the two examples share a fundamental feature in the 
cooperative build-up of a humorous interaction as a more basic phenomenon 
than for instance jokes or puns. In both cases the humorous effect is enabled 
in-and-through a shared re-orientation of the participant’s attention towards 
features in the environment embedded in a values-realizing activity of focusing 
on specific embodied features of the interaction itself. In this way, the level 
of attention and reflection is simultaneously raised – and thereby the level 
of complexity. It is a basic reflexive action oriented towards the ongoing 
interactional dynamics. In the first example, it is the vocal and inter-bodily 
activities of the two children that are treated as an affordance for naming 
the activity as an instance of ‘having fun’ – and thereby actually having fun. 
In the second example, it is the duration of the pause that is treated as 
an affordance for engaging in the situation in a completely new manner that 
eases the social pressure while enhancing the interpersonal and inter-bodily 
relation by being humorous.  Thus, both examples entail the following 
characteristics, (i) humor as a distinct way of being together embedded in 
a values-realizing activity that allow for a particular kind of behavior, (ii) an 
emergence of humor enabled by a shift in the coordinative dynamics rather 
than a transfer of semantic ‘content’. 
However, these processes of coordinative dynamics in the here-and-
now need to be embedded in a larger reflexive enculturation (Taylor, 2010) 
in which culturally informed ideas and beliefs about language are played out 
in the interactional dynamics. The socio-cultural expectations entail a level 
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of constraints that put our real-time experiences into a temporal perspective 
which in turn makes it possible to keep experiences apart in order to 
compare and evaluate them. Thus, a third characteristic needs to be included, 
(iii) humor as a temporal phenomenon integrating immediate 'here-and-now' 
environmental features with socio-cultural expectations on a longer time-
scale. This basic temporality is vital for our ability to experience anything as 
humorous or funny. As children, we learn to laugh at certain things, for 
instance someone making ‘a funny face’, only when the muscular movements 
of the face get connected to previous experiences of faces labelled as funny. 
“See, daddy looks silly now”. In such a case, it depends on our ability to:
(...) produce ordered variances that allow the invariants (i.e., stabilities) to 
be detected. Just as children learn what objects are moveable or not, and 
how so, they learn what aspects of utterances are moveable or not, and 
how so.In both cases they learn something of what those movements afford 
(Hodges, 2007, pp. 598-599)
Such “movements” allow for interactional humor to emerge. Repeated 
experiences with wordings used in different situations form the basis of 
connecting, comparing, relating and contrasting events (with or without the use 
of words) that have happened before with the present situation. 
Much more work – experimental as well as based on naturalistic data - is 
needed to substantiate the claims of this article. Still, looking at humor from 
an ecological perspective seems a promising new way to engage in 
a phenomenon that has been dealt with from a large variety of perspectives. 
To sum up, in this article it has been argued that interactional humor does not, 
in its most basic form, rest on exchange of semantic content between a speaker 
and a hearer, nor is it merely an individual psychological phenomenon. It 
cannot be reduced to psychological motivations or emotional responses in 
individual speakers. Nor is it just social. It cannot be reduced to alignment, 
cooperation, keeping social coherence or enforcing social exclusion. Rather, 
humor is nested in the realization of values in the sense that it specifies 
actions enabling us to act together in a manner which is completely different 
from other types of behavior. In this way, an ecological perspective 
conceptualizes interactional humor as a type of values realizing activity 
that directs us, our attention and our actions, towards a different kind of 
exploration of the present conversational affordances. An exploration that, for 
a brief while, makes it possible to dispense from our regular conversational 
tasks and enjoy a different perspective on the situation we are in. 
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